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This book is a collection of essays focusing on the relationship between computability and 
constructivity. Taking into account the 80 years that have passed since Alan Turing’s seminal 
paper of 1936, the papers in the book examine two lines of development: on the one hand, the 
restrictions, generalizations and other modifications of the original Turing machines, resulting 
from the pressure that the notion of computability experienced from the explosive demand for 
applications, but also from encounters with concepts that are in principle stranger to Turing ma-
chines, such as Kolmogorov complexity and linear logic. On the other hand, some of the papers 
examine a more conceptual question, namely the interconnections between computability and 
constructivity. An especially important topic is whether the notion of computable function has 
to be taken as primitive, or can be founded on recursion theory. 
Chapter 1, “Constructive Recursive Functions, Church’s Thesis, and Brouwers Theory of 
the Creating Subject: Afterthoughts on a Parisian Joint Session” by Göran Sundholm (p. 1-35) 
discusses the interdependence between recursive functions and constructivity, a topic that will 
also be examined in Chapter 6 by another author. It is argued that constructive functions can-
not be replaced by recursive functions. Nonconstructive mathematics (apparently) fail to have a 
computational meaning. But what about the converse? Sundholm asks: “Is every function used in 
constructive mathematics recursive?” The answer has been negative since Heyting and Skolem: 
in constructivism, the primitive notion of a function cannot be replaced by that of a general re-
cursive functions. The first part of this chapter explains why. A second topic discussed by Sund-
holm is the so-called Theory of the Creative Subject, which has already been called “provocative, 
attractive and dangerous” by A.S. Troelstra in his Principles of Intuitionism (1969).
The Theory of the Creative Subject, controversial even within intuitionism, was proposed 
by Brower as a method of constructing counterexamples for classical theorems based on the ac-
tivity of an idealized mathematician. It is well known that this method, in a version formulated 
by G. Kreisel and J. Myhill, can be reconstructed in a certain kind of Kripke model. By analyzing 
the controversy regarding the Theory of the Creative Subject, and the related Kripke’s Schema 
(which basically asserts for each statement A the existence of a sequence that witnesses the valid-
ity of A) Sundholm shows, in this dense paper, how Kripke’s Schema can be used as a replacement 
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for the Theory of the Creative Subject, and how this theory 
can be proved to be classically consistent, despite some of its 
apparent paradoxical unfoldings. 
Chapter 2, “The Developments of the Concept of 
Machine Computability from 1936 to the 1960s” by Jean 
Mosconi (p. 37-56) investigates the relation between com-
putation and machines, explaining how Turing’s ideas were 
gradually adopted and conveniently modified, leading to a 
close model of contemporary computers. Although Mosconi 
emphasizes the notion of constructive objects and the gener-
al notion of an algorithm on the light of Turing machines, I 
think that the reader should also take into consideration an 
illuminating paper by E.G. Daylight (2015), which explains 
why a certain group of scholars somehow associated with the 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) became in-
terested in Turing’s work and made him, in retrospect, ‘the 
father of computer science’. It seems instructive to read this 
chapter keeping in mind the misleading conception that Tur-
ing’s ideas were immediately appreciated by people involved 
in computing, after his 1936 inception of Turing machines. 
Chapter 3, “Kolmogorov Complexity in Perspective 
Part I: Information Theory and Randomness” by Marie 
Ferbus-Zanda and Serge Grigorieff (p. 57-94) studies Kolm-
ogorov complexity and the related notion of randomness. 
Kolmogorov complexity theory, or algorithmic information 
theory, was independently introduced by R.J. Solomonoff, 
A.N. Kolmogorov, and G. Chaitin, in parallel with C.E. Shan-
non’s information theory, but with different motivations. 
Both theories are intimately connected to computers, as they 
aim to provide measures of information by using the idea of 
the bit as a unity. As proposed by Chaitin, the notion of com-
plexity can be used to provide a notion of randomness, via 
the so-called algorithmic definition of randomness, by relying 
on the capabilities and limitations of digital computers. This 
chapter, with a more technical nature, explains the main con-
cepts and proofs related to these topics, also expounding oth-
er related notions of complexity, such as L. Levin’s monotone 
complexity and K.P. Schnorr’s process complexity. 
Though not directly emphasized in this chapter, it is 
worth noting the intimate connection between the famous 
Gödel’s incompleteness proof and the theory of random 
numbers, as made clear in several works by Chaitin (the most 
relevant papers in this respect are cited in the chapter’s bib-
liography). As far as the most known proofs of Gödel’s in-
completeness theorem are based on a version of the paradox 
of Epimenides, there is a similar proof of randomic incom-
pleteness based on a variant of Berry’s paradox. This relevant 
result on measuring randomness, together with other results 
such as P. Martin-Löf ’s, showing that randomness is equiva-
lent to incompressibility, points to the possibility of using ran-
domness as a foundation for probability theory, as explained 
in the chapter. 
Chapter 4, “Kolmogorov Complexity in Perspective 
Part II: Classification, Information Processing and Duality” 
by Marie Ferbus-Zanda (p. 95-134) is a sequel to the previ-
ous chapter, with a more conceptual look at Kolmogorov al-
gorithmic information theory. The chapter proposes to take 
this theory seriously as a mathematical foundation of infor-
mation classification, discussing how the notions of compres-
sion and information content are related to classification and 
structure, and more generally to database and information 
systems. Google’s method of extracting information from the 
gigantic, unstructured databank represented by the World 
Wide Web (bottom-up model) and the relational database 
method based on pure logic (top-down model) to organize 
data, as proposed by E.F. Codd in 1970, are paradigmatic cases 
of classification and structure of information studied in this 
intricate chapter. Such models are the basis for the duality be-
tween the two modes of definition of mathematical objects: 
iterative definitions, and inductive (or recursive) definitions. 
The chapter makes clear how foundations of mathematics, 
information theory, and real-world applications are closely 
connected. 
Chapter 5, “Proof-Theoretic Semantics and Feasibility” 
by Jean Fichot (p. 135-157) deals with foundations of con-
structibility by examining interpretations of constructive rea-
soning according to which the meaning of logical constants is 
determined by the way they are used in a language, or in other 
words that the meaning of the logical constants can be spec-
ified in terms of the introduction rules governing theman 
idea that amounts to G. Gentzen’s proof-theoretical investi-
gations, complemented with the view that elimination rules 
are strictly unnecessary and can be obtained as a consequence 
of introduction definitions. This involves, however, the ide-
alization behind canonical proofs, with dangers to feasibility. 
By examining the notions of polytime functions (introduced 
by S. Bellantoni and S. Cook in 1979), and a modification of 
linear logic, the light affine logic, introduced by A. Asperti in 
1998, Fichot outlines a proof-theoretic semantics for feasible 
logic and for first-order light affine logic, evaluating their con-
sequences. 
Chapter 6, “Recursive Functions and Constructive 
Mathematics” by Thierry Coquand (p. 159-167) again takes 
up a fundamental question already treated in Chapter 1: is 
the theory of recursive functions necessary for a rigorous 
treatment of constructible mathematics? The chapter ex-
plains that, from the point of view of constructive mathemat-
ics, recursive functions are not needed for the foundations of 
constructible mathematics, and that mathematics done from 
an intuitionistic viewpoint does not rely on any notion of al-
gorithm. This is hardly a novelty: in our book, Computability: 
Computable Functions, Logic, and the Foundations of Mathematics 
(Epstein and Carnielli, 2008, Chapter 26)2, it is explained 
in clear terms that recursive analysis is quite different from 
2 See also the Brazilian edition, Computabilidade: Funções Computáveis, Lógica e os Fundamentos da Matemática (Carnielli and Ep-
stein, 2009).
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Brower’s intuitionism, and also how Bishop criticizes Brow-
er’s work as too imprecise and infinitistic, and recursive anal-
ysis as too formal and limited. Indeed, it is well known that 
Bishop takes the notion of constructive function as primitive, 
refusing to identify it with any formal notion. This chapter, 
however, enriches its arguments with some brief accounts on 
the work of Heyting, Skolem, Novikoff, and Lorenzen, be-
sides Bishop. 
Chapter 7, “Gödel and Intuitionism” by Mark Atten 
(p. 169-214) closes the book, discussing how Brouwer’s intu-
itionism inspired the work of Gödel, with reflections in his 
famous Dialectica Interpretation. The interest of Gödel for 
Husserl and Brouwer is comparable to Gödel’s fascination 
with Leibniz, and can explain Gödel’s belief that the phe-
nomenology of Husserl would prove useful for his program 
of “developing philosophy as an exact science” and the Dia-
lectica Interpretation as a phenomenological contribution to 
intuitionism. An appendix to Gödel’s archives shows how he 
anticipated the concept of autonomous transfinite progres-
sions of theories (the idea of generating a hierarchy of theories 
via a bootstrapping process, introduced in the literature by G. 
Kreisel in 1958) while working on his incompleteness proof. 
The present book is the result of a meeting under the 
same name, “Constructivity and Computability in Histori-
cal and Philosophical Perspective”, held at the École Normale 
Supérieure in Paris, in December 2006. As the back cover 
states, this book contributes to the unity of science by aim-
ing to overcome disagreements and misunderstandings that 
stand in the way of a unifying view of logic, and I believe it 
reaches its aims by weaving a deep and detailed account link-
ing the mathematical and philosophical aspects of construc-
tibility and recursivity, showing the limitations of both con-
structivist and classical mathematics. 
Although at some points it is a bit difficult to read, as often 
happens with collections of texts sewing together pieces with 
different patterns and styles, this book is highly recommend-
able for logicians, philosophers, mathematicians, and computer 
scientists who want to understand how their fields interact.
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